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I. 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
1. Robert Troy Jensen, Plaintiff, is an individual, residing in or around Cedar City, 
Utah. 
2. Scott Smith, M.D., Defendant, is an individual licensed to practice medicine in the 
State of Utah. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(4) and § 78-2a-3(j). 
III. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
In this action for medical malpractice, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit from a 
physician in response to a Motion for Summary Judgment by the Defendant. Both 
Plaintiff and Defendant failed to designate an expert within the time allowed under the 
default provisions for a discovery plan pursuant to Rule 26 U.R.C.P. 1999 Amendment. 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The first issue on appeal is whether or not the filing of an affidavit by a medical 
doctor, though considered an individual not yet designated as an expert, was sufficient 
under Rule 56(f) to survive Summary Judgment. Defendant asserts that the standard of 
review is one of abuse of discretion based on a motion for additional discovery. No 
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motion for additional discovery was made, but rather, summary judgment was granted at 
the trial court level. As such, the granting of Summary Judgment is reviewed for 
correctness, with no deference to the Trial Court's decision. Mackintosh v. Hampshire, 
832 P.2d 1298 (Utah App. 1992). All evidence is to be considered in the light most 
favoring the losing party. Owens v. Garfield 784 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Utah 1989). 
The second issue on appeal is whether or not Res Ipsa Loquitur may apply to the 
facts at hand to survive Summary Judgment absent an expert to testify regarding the 
standard of care. Again, a grant of Summary Judgment is reviewed for correctness, with 
no deference given to the trial court's decision. Mackintosh, supra. All evidence is to be 
considered in the light most favoring the losing party. 
V. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
3. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
4. Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
VI. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff filed suit on or around December 5, 2003. The parties engaged in 
informal discovery subject to the default provisions of the 1999 Amendments of Rule 26 
where the parties did not agree to a Discovery Plan and did not seek an Order from the 
Court. The discovery conducted included multiple written discovery requests, and the 
depositions of both parties. Defendant filed a designation of an Expert on or about March 
21, 2006, and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on that same day for Plaintiffs 
failure to submit an expert affidavit. The grounds for the Summary Judgment motion 
were that without a designated expert, Plaintiff could not establish the applicable medical 
standard of care. Prior to the decision of the trial court, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit of 
Dr. Barry E. Gustin, M.D., regarding the standard of care, as well as a Designation of 
Expert Witness. The trial court entered their Memorandum Decision and Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on August 17, 2006. 
VIL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff began his physician patient relationship with the Defendant, Dr. Scott 
Smith, in April of 2000, and later underwent a below-knee-amputation of his leg. 
Defendant performed a center-line stitching of the amputation, without leaving a flap of 
skin to wrap over the stump. This stitching, as well as other elements of alleged 
malpractice, led to the inability of the wound to heal and the inability of the Plaintiff to 
use prosthetics. This open wound grew worse and ultimately required an above-knee 
amputation. Plaintiff asserts that the applicable medical standard of care was breached by 
the Defendant in performing the foregoing medical procedures. 
VIIL 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant's statement of the issues attempts unduly to broaden them so as to 
dilute the attention that each assigned error merits. The issue before the Court of Appeals 
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is a narrow one. In the event of a Motion for Summary Judgment against a Plaintiff in a 
medical malpractice case, must the affidavit submitted for the purposes of Rule 56 be one 
submitted by a designated expert? An affidavit placing issues of material fact at issue 
was submitted, prior to the ruling by the trial court, by a medical doctor intended to be 
the expert witness of the Plaintiff, and as such, Summary Judgment under Rule 56 was 
improper. At the time of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Dr. Barry Gustin, MD, had 
not yet provided his affidavit regarding the standard of care in the foregoing case, hence, 
the Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56(f). However, 
as that affidavit was submitted prior to the ruling by the trial court, a genuine issue of 
material fact was placed at issue by an affidavit of an individual not yet determined to be 
allowed to testify as an expert or not. 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiff Can Establish a Right to Recovery Precluding Summary Judgment 
Plaintiff filed his Affidavit and Designation of Expert witness prior to the ruling 
on the Motion for Summary Judgment. The designation of an expert was tardy by both 
parties, and the Judge never ruled on the Motion to Strike the Motion to Strike 
Designation of Expert Witness filed by the Defendant. It is undisputed that medical 
negligence normally requires establishment through expert testimony. See Pete v. 
Youmblood. 141 P.3d 629 (Utah 2006); Dallevv. Utah Valley Rez'l Med. Ctr., 791 P.2d 
193, 195-96 (Utah 1990). 
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In his Reply Brief, Defendant states that the trial court properly ignored Plaintiffs 
late expert designation based on the ruling of Arnold. Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307 
(Utah 1993). His reliance on that case, however, is misplaced. There are several factual 
distinctions that illustrate the impropriety of Summary Judgment in the case at bar as 
compared to that case. First, in that case, the Defendants had designated their expert 
within the time required by the scheduling order, and second, the expert opinion of the 
Plaintiff was excluded as a discovery sanction pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(B) which was 
determined to be within the discretion of the trial court. To the contrary, in the case at 
bar, neither party submitted their expert affidavit in a timely manner, and no Rule 37 
discovery sanctions were requested or imposed by the trial court prior to the filing of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Rather, it is still not yet decided by the trial court 
whether or not the Designation of the Expert of the Plaintiff should be stricken as the trial 
court considered the issue moot. 
Interestingly, this is the very issue that requires adjudication and makes a ruling on 
a Motion for Summary Judgment premature. Were the Plaintiff to prevail in the Motion 
to Strike by the Defendant, and the Plaintiff were to be allowed to present the expert 
medical testimony of Dr. Barry Gustin, Plaintiff could proceed to trial and establish all 
necessary elements of medical negligence. We must emphasize that "Litigants must be 
able to present their cases fully to court before judgment can be rendered against them 
unless it is obvious from evidence before court that party opposing judgment can 
establish no right to recovery." Drvsdale v. Ford Motor Co.. 1997, 947 P.2d 678, 328 
Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 329 Utah Adv. Rep. 28. More specifically, a Motion for Summary 
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Judgment is a harsh measure, and for such reason contentions of (a) party opposing the 
motion must be considered in a light most advantageous to him and all doubts resolved in 
favor of permitting him to go to trial, and (the) motion should be granted only when, 
viewing the matter thusly, no right to recovery could be established. Rule 56 
Annotations; Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman* 1966, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d 
807. 
II. The Filing of a Rule 56(f) Affidavit was the Proper Response to a Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
The ruling of the trial court stated that the reliance on Rule 56(f) was improper in 
an opposition to summary judgment when the time frame for filing an expert opinion had 
passed. Rather, the court opined that a request for an extension of the discovery 
deadlines was proper. However, this analysis is flawed, as absent a discovery sanction 
precluding the expert affidavit submitted by the Plaintiff, a sufficient issue of material 
fact is created by the affidavit of Dr. Gustin. In light of the holding that summary 
judgment is a drastic remedy and should be granted with reluctance, the Plaintiff was 
required to provide a single sworn statement to oppose summary judgment. (Housley v. 
Anaconda Co., 1967, 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390; Webster v. Sill 1983, 675 P.2d 
1170). Because Dr. Barry had not yet submitted his affidavit, a request for a continuance 
or extra time to obtain the affidavit was necessary. (See Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P.). Had 
Plaintiffs instead provided a Motion for an Extension of Discovery pursuant to Rule 6(b), 
there still would not have been a sworn statement placing at dispute an issue of material 
fact sufficient to overcome summary judgment. As such, Rule 6(b) could not possibly be 
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considered a proper response to a Motion for Summary Judgment. Rather, in summary 
judgment proceedings, the only two Utah cases addressing the issue held that failing to 
properly request an extension of time for action under Rule 6(b) is not sufficient to 
preclude the granting of Summary Judgment. Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation 
Corp., 1973, 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538; Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v. 
Blomquist, 1972, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019. Because moving for an extension under 
Rule 6(b) would not create a genuine issue of material fact, such suggested response to a 
Motion for Summary Judgment would be insufficient. (Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P.). However, 
by providing a Rule 56(f) affidavit, and later providing the requisite expert affidavit, 
Defendant cannot make a "(s)liowing (as a) party moving for summary judgment (that) 
preclude(s) all reasonable possibility that loser could, if given trial, produce evidence 
which could reasonably sustain judgment for loser." Green v. Gam, 1961, 11 Utah 2d 
375, 359 P.2d 1050. 
If it were decided that the expert testimony of Dr. Garrett was excluded as a Rule 
37 sanction for failing to designate an expert within the time allowed, the holding of 
Arnold v. Curtis could properly be applied. However, as it stands, it is undecided as to 
whether or not the affidavit of Dr. Garrett would be allowed as an expert affidavit. From 
the prior conduct of the trial court, it has been accepted that late designations of experts 
are accepted and still treated as expert opinions unless explicitly ruled otherwise. (See 
Defendant's Designation of their Expert Witness March 21, 2006). However, for the 
purposes of a Motion for Summary Judgment, an affidavit has been supplied which has 
created a clear genuine issue of material fact. Award of summary judgment is only 
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appropriate if pleadings, affidavits, and other submissions of parties show that no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and that moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of 
law. Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co.. 1986, 714 P.2d 648. Whether the affidavit 
raising an issue of material fact will be qualified as expert testimony is yet to be decided 
in the pending Motion to Strike the Affidavit before the trial court, which was 
erroneously considered moot after the summary judgment ruling of August 17, 2006. But 
when there is no Rule 37 sanction precluding the use of the affidavit of Dr. Garrett, and 
where a designation of an expert has been submitted and not yet ruled upon as to its 
acceptability, all elements necessary to overcome a Motion for Summary Judgment have 
more than been met. 
III. Res Ipsa Loquitur is not a Claim or Defense to be Raised Prior to Appeal. 
Defendant cites Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983) in support of his 
assertion that the applicability of the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur cannot be raised for 
the first time at the Appellate level. However, Bangerter stands for the doctrine that no 
new claims or defenses may be raised at the Appellate level. Res Ipsa Loquitur is a legal 
doctrine that allows negligence to be inferred, and in the context of medical malpractice 
cases, precludes the necessity of an expert opinion to establish the standard of care. Pete 
v. Youmblood. 141 P.3d 629 (Utah 2006). 
The question then, is whether or not the doctrine may apply to the foregoing facts, 
which have already been pled in their entirety, and which need not contain an allegation 
of Res Ipsa Loquitur. Id. The pleading of the facts arising to negligence give the 
Defendant notice of the assertions being made against him, and the applicability of a 
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legal doctrine to those facts is neither a claim, nor a defense, and need not be raised prior 
to trial for the doctrine to be provided in the jury instructions. Id at 638. "Although 
certain claims and defenses must be pleaded expressly or with specificity, res ipsa 
loquitur is not one of them." Id. at 639. 
Considering such argument, Plaintiff relies on the factual scenario to discount the 
possibility that Res Ipsa may or may not be applicable. Such a factual assertion by the 
Defendant only highlights that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the standard of 
care in the medical field understood and expected by a layman. See Pete v. Youngblood, 
at 636. 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in Plaintiff/Appellant's opening brief and this reply brief, 
this Court should reverse the District Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment and 
remand the case back to the District Court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 5th day of February 2007. 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF & ASSOCIATES 
Mark H.Graff LJ> ( J 
A ttorneyfor Plaintiff/Appellant v ^^^^ 
9 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
I, Jennifer Taylor, Legal Assistant, hereby certify that on the 5th day of February 
2007,1 caused to be mailed, U.S. first-class postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief, to the following: 
DAVID H. EPPERSON 
DAVID C. EPPERSON 
EPPERSON & RENCHER 
10 West 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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